Somewhere, Mike Taibbi must be swelled with paternal pride. While elder Mike has toiled over the years at network broadcast affiliates — doing the occasional snow report and/or covering Groundhog Day festivities for the local news — his son Matt has gone all “Cameron Crowe” and gets to write for Rolling Stone. Meaning, lots of profanity and long-winded left-leaning investigative journalism into paranoid conspiracy theories and good old-fashioned America bashing.
Still, there are some interesting and useful nuggets to be gained from Taibbi’s recent piece, “The Big Takeover,” a closer look into how a giant insurance corporation such as AIG managed to wind up in broke-ass poverty and begging at the government teat for bailout after bailout.
I already covered the derivatives and mortgage-backed securities aspect in great detail; what this article does is take the scenario farther, into how AIG became caught up in credit-default swaps and how one man — AIG Financial Products Chief Joseph Cassano — can be found at Ground Zero of the disaster.
In its simplest form, a CDS is just a bet on an outcome. Say Bank A writes a million-dollar mortgage to the Pope for a town house in the West Village. Bank A wants to hedge its mortgage risk in case the Pope can’t make his monthly payments, so it buys CDS protection from Bank B, wherein it agrees to pay Bank B a premium of $1,000 a month for five years. In return, Bank B agrees to pay Bank A the full million-dollar value of the Pope’s mortgage if he defaults. In theory, Bank A is covered if the Pope goes on a meth binge and loses his job.
When Morgan presented their plans for credit swaps to regulators in the late Nineties, they argued that if they bought CDS protection for enough of the investments in their portfolio, they had effectively moved the risk off their books. Therefore, they argued, they should be allowed to lend more, without keeping more cash in reserve. A whole host of regulators — from the Federal Reserve to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency — accepted the argument, and Morgan was allowed to put more money on the street.
What Cassano did was to transform the credit swaps that Morgan popularized into the world’s largest bet on the housing boom. In theory, at least, there’s nothing wrong with buying a CDS to insure your investments. Investors paid a premium to AIGFP, and in return the company promised to pick up the tab if the mortgage-backed CDOs went bust. But as Cassano went on a selling spree, the deals he made differed from traditional insurance in several significant ways. First, the party selling CDS protection didn’t have to post any money upfront. When a $100 corporate bond is sold, for example, someone has to show 100 actual dollars. But when you sell a $100 CDS guarantee, you don’t have to show a dime. So Cassano could sell investment banks billions in guarantees without having any single asset to back it up.
Secondly, Cassano was selling so-called “naked” CDS deals. In a “naked” CDS, neither party actually holds the underlying loan. In other words, Bank B not only sells CDS protection to Bank A for its mortgage on the Pope — it turns around and sells protection to Bank C for the very same mortgage. This could go on ad nauseam: You could have Banks D through Z also betting on Bank A’s mortgage. Unlike traditional insurance, Cassano was offering investors an opportunity to bet that someone else’s house would burn down, or take out a term life policy on the guy with AIDS down the street. It was no different from gambling, the Wall Street version of a bunch of frat brothers betting on Jay Feely to make a field goal. Cassano was taking book for every bank that bet short on the housing market, but he didn’t have the cash to pay off if the kick went wide.
Call me naive — after all, I only got a C+ in Intro Corporate Finance because I could not wrap my brain around all of the derivative bullshit — but that sounds like a risky damn plan if there ever was, especially since a mere cursory look at the housing market would make it abundantly apparent that the incredible boom we witnessed in the past decade could not last. So the market goes bust, every big better with a CDS calls in their bet, and AIG is left holding an empty yet bottomless bag.
Which brings us back to the issue of the bailout, and the use of the funds to at least in part pay off massive bonuses to the executive staff that created the financial mess in the first place, all on the taxpayer dime. It is the worst of the worst in terms of public perception, and bad policy to begin with. Why reward a business and executives that so clearly merely made very poor investment and other business decisions.
So, despite knowing all along that the bonuses were included as part of the bailout plan, Congress this week sought to impose a 90% tax on income derived from those bonuses.
Today, the House of Representatives passed a bill, 328-93, that would put a 90% tax on bonuses from financial firms receiving bailout funds, such as AIG. One of the bill’s cosponsors, Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-Manhattan), who proposed a 100% tax earlier, said, “I’m proud that the House has taken action to return these bonuses to the federal treasury… It would be morally reprehensible and fiscally irresponsible to allow millions to go to those who cost our country billions. Bonuses should be based on creating value, not destroying it.”
Well, in purely rhetorical/moral terms this would be a rare instance where I completely agree with Ms. Maloney. These guys stink at basic business theory and should not be rewarded for their actions ever under any rational point of view.

Of course, that being said, imposing this sort of plan after the fact reeks of a CYA maneuver by both the legislature and President Zero that is chilling in its utter lack of constitutional understanding and potential future ramifications. I have no doubt that other more scholarly constitutional experts have already discussed the “Bill of Attainder” concept and how this law it in fact patently illegal under any circumstance. On a more philosophical level, though, it’s downright horrifying to think that the government could impose a specific tax of any sort on a handful of individuals as it sees fit, a sort of punitive quick-fix for any messy scenarios that political figures find themselves ensnared in that completely avoids the concept of due-process at the same time.
So what do we do? I have no easy answers, the matter is now so intricately tied into the fiber of our government and economy that it’s hard to turn around now and just let the biggest insurance firm in the world go belly up. But without addressing some key issues — increased transparency from the Federal Reserve and resolving the conflicts of interest that arise from the repeal of Glass-Steagall — it’s hard to know if we won’t just wind up back in this situation again in a few years, at increased expense.